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Introduction
The security threat posed by email-based phishing campaigns targeted at employees is 
a well-known problem experienced by many organizations. Attacks are reported each 
year, and a reduction in the number of such attacks is unlikely to occur in the near 
future (see Fig.  1). A common type of phishing attack involves an attacker attempt-
ing to trick victims into clicking on links sent via email. Such links redirect victims to 
websites that are carefully designed to mimic those of legitimate organizations with the 
goal of convincing users to provide their personal information and credentials. Attack-
ers then use the phished data to execute their schemes further. Phishing attacks may be 
used to obtain access to an organization’s internal servers and steal company secrets or 
to steal victims’ personal information, such as credit card details [1]. In this publica-
tion, we focus on email-based phishing attacks, as this is currently the most commonly 
used channel and poses a significant threat to both individuals and companies globally 
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[2]. Therefore, in this paper, the term phishing always refers to email-based phishing. 
Phishing is a lucrative criminal activity that is seldom prosecuted. Moreover, take-down 
measures are often ineffective, as the landing pages used in phishing attacks transmit the 
stolen data before they can be shut down [3]. As depicted in Fig.  1, the amount of global 
phishing attacks is still huge despite more efforts in combatting them. Failing to address 
or ignoring the threat posed by phishing can result in detrimental consequences for any 
company. The 2015 Sony Inc. hack is an example of a successful phishing campaign and 
demonstrates the extent of the damage that such an attack can cause [4]. In this case, 
according to the New York Times, the damage was in the order of hundreds of millions of 
US dollars [5].
To increase the perceived legitimacy of phishing emails, attackers often adjust their 
campaigns according to current events. For example, shortly after the publication of the 
results of the 2016 United States (US) election, Russian hackers began sending emails 
with malicious zip files attached from spoofed Harvard University email addresses alleg-
edly explaining “Why American Elections are Flawed” [6]. Thus, phishing attacks can be 
very organized and sophisticated, with the potential to cause extensive damage to the 
targeted party and maximize the gains for the attackers. The damage caused by phishing 
attacks can only be estimated, as not all incidents are reported, and the overall damage 
caused can be challenging to quantify [2]. Nevertheless, Hong et al. [11] reported that 
the direct loss caused by phishing in the U.S. varies from 61 million to 3 billion USD 
per year. However, these figures do not reflect the whole picture, as substantial indirect 
costs are also incurred of post-attack disruption to the ordinary course of business. In 
addition, phishing attacks are often used as a starting point for other detrimental cyber-
attacks [4]. As stated in the 2019 Ninth Annual Cost of Cybercrime Study published by 
Accenture Security, attackers often begin by targeting the human layer, which is the 
weakest link in corporate electronic security [2]. In 2013, the Wall Street Journal pub-
lished an article estimating the annual cost of cybercrimes in the U.S. at 100 billion USD 
[12]. Similarly, based on the rapid global digitalization of consumers’ lives and enter-
prise records, Juniper Research estimated the costs resulting from data breaches in 2015, 
Fig. 1 Amount of global phishing attacks reported by APWG [7–10]
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reaching 500 billion USD globally [13]. The recent 2019 Official Annual Cybercrime 
Report from Cybersecurity Ventures, discusses costs of up to 3 trillion USD globally for 
2015 and estimates that this figure will double by 2021 [14]. Despite the variety in terms 
of the figures estimated, the resulting picture is clear: As a security threat, phishing has 
to be taken seriously, as it can cause both direct and indirect costs and can open the 
door to other, even costlier, attacks [15].
Although there exist various technical solutions intended to prevent phishing emails 
from reaching their targets, such systems are not perfect and cannot filter out all mali-
cious emails [16]. Attackers (i.e., phishers), have invariably found means of circumvent-
ing newly implemented protection mechanisms in the long run [17]. In that regard, 
techniques based on Machine Learning (ML) have yielded promising results compared 
to other solutions, as, in some cases, they have almost completely defeated zero-hour 
phishing attacks and have demonstrated very high true-positive detection rates [18]. 
Nevertheless, ML does not represent a “silver bullet” against phishing as there are practi-
cal challenges that remain to be overcome, such as how these systems should be trained 
or the threat of adversarial use of ML. As ML is still not an entirely bullet-proof tech-
nique, the phishing problem continues to pose a threat [19, 20].
Therefore, an essential part of any institution’s anti-phishing strategy is to take a 
proactive stance by educating its users so that they can identify phishing emails them-
selves and act accordingly. There are various suggestions concerning how this goal can 
be accomplished, including offering dedicated courses or simulating encounters with 
phishing emails, with such scenarios often developed by an institution’s own security 
staff. As research results show, however, it is unclear how successful any of these meth-
ods are (see “Impact of anti-phishing training” section for a detailed discussion). Thus, 
considerable academic attention has recently been paid to how anti-phishing education 
can be improved and how the utility of this proactive approach can be maximized. How-
ever, sources in the literature are occasionally not consistent among themselves concern-
ing specific factors and their impact. This phenomenon results in a situation in which it 
is challenging for practitioners to create efficient anti-phishing training programs based 
on academic findings. Additionally, to make the identification of research gaps easier, 
researchers need to make additional efforts to grasp an overview of the current state of 
the art. Given the lack of consensus in the literature, it remains challenging to create an 
effective anti-phishing training program.
Research contributions
Designing an effective anti-phishing strategy involves considering multiple factors, such 
as how, when and at what frequency users should undergo training. In this work, the 
term training is used to refer to a process (e.g., a course), intended to improve a person’s 
awareness and knowledge of phishing, which in turn has a potential impact on his or her 
ability to detect and respond to phishing attempts. Such training can involve different 
instruments or media, such as computer-based simulations, videos, and leaflets or other 
printed materials.
To address the challenges associated with training employees to avoid such attacks, we 
identify relevant factors that should be considered in a company’s anti-phishing training 
program, then provide a comprehensive survey of relevant research results and, based 
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on these findings, present a proposal for an ideal anti-phishing training program. The 
research questions we address within this survey are:
• What are the relevant factors of an effective anti-phishing training?
• Are there any controversial reports of anti-phishing training effects in the academic 
work of the last 17 years?
• What are the implications of current research findings for designing effective anti-
phishing training programs?
This effort is crucial, as insights into anti-phishing training and into how an effective 
training program can be developed are instrumental in improving defense against 
phishing attacks. Moreover, a training program serves to reduce potential damage and 
increase the overall security of organizations. Current research indicates that factors 
such as the selected training method, how feedback should be provided to users, how 
training materials should be designed and how retraining intervals should be organized 
are relevant and thus have direct impact on the success of an anti-phishing program 
[21–26]. Considering these findings, this paper makes the following contributions:
• It identifies relevant academic works on anti-phishing training (“Methodology” sec-
tion);
• It defines multiple categories, each covering one or several of the identified core 
areas by examining and categorizing the surveyed works (“Categories” section);
• It concisely presents the most important findings of each study and their implica-
tions for an envisaged training program (“Literature analysis” section);
• It proposes an effective anti-phishing training program based on the performed anal-
ysis (“Discussion” section).
The next section provides essential background information on phishing. We briefly dis-
cuss what phishing is and what can be done to address it. In “Methodology” section, we 
describe the methodology applied in the identification and categorization of phishing 
studies. We then present a comparative literature analysis, which includes a detailed dis-
cussion of findings from a wide range of research works in “Literature analysis” section. 
The discussion in “Discussion” section further elaborates on those findings to indicate 
how they can be used to improve the design and execution of an effective anti-phishing 
training program. “Discussion” section also describes how anti-phishing training tools 
intended to support the features required for such programs should be developed. Then, 
"Conclusion" section presents our conclusions and key findings, followed by future 
research directions in “Future research directions” section.
Phishing
The term phishing refers to attempts by attackers to trick victims into performing a spe-
cific action. The objective of such an action could be manifold: it may aim to make the 
users click on an email attachment, download and execute a file from the Internet. It 
may also trick them to execute an action on an online platform or to unknowingly pro-
vide confidential information such as login or bank details [1, 27, 28]. Often, attackers 
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first attempt to gain the trust of their victims and then abuse that trust to lure users 
into accessing fraudulent or hacked websites. These websites are carefully designed 
not to make users suspicious and, for example, contain forms that relay entered data 
directly to the attacker, provide malicious files to download, or contain exploits that 
infect the victims’ devices with malware [11]. Such malware can then be used for a wide 
range of attacks, such as infecting the target with ransomware or engaging in industrial 
espionage.
Figure 2 presents an example of an email-based phishing attack [29]. First, attackers 
identify an existing website containing a form requesting the data they wish to obtain. 
They then set up a phishing website by cloning the existing one, design an email contain-
ing a link to the phishing website (step 1), and send the email(s) to the phishing victim(s) 
(step 2). In the event of a successful attack, the victim thinks the email is legitimate; he 
or she then clicks the link and provides an attack with the desired data (step 3).
One key element of an institution’s anti-phishing campaign is the education of its 
employees. Currently, several techniques are used to achieve this goal. The most promi-
nent of these are providing informative material concerning phishing, offering dedicated 
computer-based or “offline” anti-phishing training courses, and developing a phishing 
simulation that provides anti-phishing training materials if a link is clicked [21, 22, 25, 
30]. All of these strategies have different pros and cons, which should be considered 
from a cost-benefit perspective. In particular, the resources required (e.g., money) are 
often a decisive limiting factor. For instance, according to research based on responses 
provided by 500 companies with between 1000 and 5000 employees in 2017, the cost of 
user security education that includes anti-phishing training has reached approximately 
290 K USD per year for large enterprises [31]. Therefore, we believe that determining 
the most effective training program is critical in overcoming such concerns and improv-
ing cybersecurity. However, please note that addressing the cost-effectiveness of training 
programs is beyond the scope of this survey.
Besides generic phishing, in which many potential victims are targeted, spear phishing 
describes a specially tailored phishing attack against one victim or a small group thereof 
[33]. Attackers research their targets and abuse the acquired information to design 
1) designs
1) sets up
Attacker
contains link to
2) send to
Phishing Email
3) clicks link and 
enters data
Victim
identical clone
Original Website
3) Stores phished data
Fake Website
Database
Fig. 2 Example of an email based phishing attack
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phishing emails for each victim. As, in such cases, the contents of a phishing email will 
then reflect the target’s current activities, the likelihood of the attack succeeding will 
probably increase. An example of a spear phishing email exploiting the current activities 
of its target is presented in Fig. 3.
Phishing countermeasures
Phishing countermeasures can be applied at several stages during an attack. Consider-
ing the general attack model in Fig. 2, a technical filtering solution could be deployed 
in Step 2 (e.g., [20]). Such solutions process and analyze all incoming email messages 
and, based on rules or ML, classify them as either phishing or legitimate. ML filtering 
techniques have become state of the art and the classification of phishing website (e.g., 
[34–38]) can be used for blacklists. Such approaches can prevent a phishing message 
from reaching the target user, but attackers can use ML techniques as well (e.g., [39]) for 
bypassing such AI detection systems. Furthermore, ML based countermeasures can be 
further adapted and optimized for different operational environments to improve per-
formance and combat implementation challenges. A recent example is [40] where the 
authors have implemented an anti-phishing virtual network function at the edge of the 
network with embedded robust machine learning techniques for phishing detection.
Alternatively, education of users is a proactive method. In other words, users them-
selves could be educated to identify phishing scams (e.g., [41]). By creating awareness 
of phishing attacks and training users to be able to identify them, this method can 
prevent employees from falling victim to phishing scams and therefore prevent pos-
sible information leaks. Additionally, web filtering software or a specific firewall 
could be used to analyze all of the websites visited by an employee (Step 3 in Fig. 2) 
and attempt to prevent access to sites with malicious intent (e.g., [42]). This would 
again prevent users from inadvertently leaking information. A more active approach 
is the take-down of phishing websites by third parties such as the law enforcement 
agencies (LEAs) or the hosting services to prevent potential victims from access-
ing such websites (e.g., [3]). According to Hong et al. [11], the duration of the entire 
Fig. 3 Sample spear-phishing email abusing a user’s curiosity by the fact that the content fits the target’s 
actual behavior, as the receiver was about to give a talk at BlackHat USA 2016 [32]
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take-down process averages approximately 62 h. An important requirement for an 
efficient mitigation effort is multi-agency participation (e.g. Internet users, brand 
enterprises, browser manufacturers and authorities) with uniform data sharing for-
mat and unobstructed sharing channels for common phishing reporting. One way to 
achieve this is with multi-party phishing data sharing platform based on blockchains 
[43]. In summary, the methods listed in Table 1 are available to counteract phishing.
When attempting to address phishing attacks, security should always be imple-
mented using multiple layers of defense (defense-in-depth), as each layer has its 
strengths and weaknesses [45]. In that regard, each layer should be considered break-
able, as no bullet-proof solution against phishing currently exists. Therefore, a com-
bination of the layers, as mentioned earlier, would be an approach to the problem. 
An essential aspect of such a defense strategy would be to educate employees and 
strengthen their ability to identify phishing attacks. This requirement raises the criti-
cal question of how anti-phishing training programs and tools should be designed 
and implemented, which constitutes the primary rationale for the contributions made 
by this paper.
Methodology
In this section, we describe how the literature for this survey was selected. We explain 
the methods used for searching, filtering, and selecting the literature. Moreover, we 
introduce a categorization system for academic anti-phishing training papers and use 
this system in “Literature analysis” section to categorize the selected papers.
During this study, we carried out two iterations of our literature selection process. 
We conducted the first iteration in November 2018, and it includes articles from 2003 
to 2018. It contains the main corpus of our research. In April 2020, we executed the 
second iteration of our selection with the scope of articles from 2019 and 2020 during 
the peer review process of our paper. We chose articles between 2019 and 2020 for 
the completeness of our survey and because we wanted to include the latest state-of-
the-art articles when it is published.
The literature related to anti-phishing training is extensive. It covers areas rang-
ing from technical approaches for exploiting a weakness of a given email client with 
phishing purposes to user education in general. In this work, we analyze a compre-
hensive set of publications related to factors relevant to anti-phishing training and the 
Table 1 Phishing countermeasures
Counter-measure Example Approach
Filtering [20] Analyze all incoming email messages and filter them based on their class: 
phishing or legitimate
Education of users [41] Train employees to protect them from falling victim to phishing attacks and 
prevent possible information leaks
Web filtering [42] Analyze browsed websites and identify possible phishing sites in order to warn 
the user or completely block access to the suspected sites
Website take-downs [44] Take down the phishing site to prevent potential victims from accessing such 
websites (usually by external parties such as LEAs or hosting service provid-
ers)
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success thereof. There are several types of training, such as the use of using videos, 
web-based courses, informational material such as leaflets/flyers, or simulated phish-
ing attacks. No specific type of training is favored in this publication.
To this end, “Identifying relevant sources” section provides information concerning 
how the works included in this survey were chosen (i.e., what criteria they had to meet). 
In “Categories” section, we accordingly construct categories based on the identified lit-
erature, which we later utilize to classify the surveyed papers.
Identifying relevant sources
To render it as reproducible and as clear as possible, we have divided the identification 
process into multiple steps. This section explains each step in detail, while Table 2 shows 
how those steps were used to narrow the relevant literature down to the works included 
in this survey.
Prior to the first step, in which the search keywords were defined and the initial set 
of publications was obtained, potential electronic sources were evaluated. Querying the 
search engines of IEEE1, ACM2, ScienceDirect3, Wiley4 and GS5 with the keyword “anti-
phishing training” (including the quotation marks) returned the following number of 
publications: GS: 406, IEEExplore: 2, ACM Digital Library: 3, ScienceDirect: 11, Wiley 
Online Library: 5. Cross-checking the publications returned by each search engine indi-
cated that the search engine that returned the most results, GS, already included the 
publications found by the other engines. As stated in the GS About page [46], this engine 
provides a service that allows users to search the databases of many publishers from one 
location as reflected in the results of our initial search engine test. Therefore, GS was 
selected as the literature search engine for this survey.
In Step 1 of the first iteration, which is the start of the literature identification pro-
cess, GS was used to obtain a set of publications for potential inclusion in this survey. 
Table 2 Methodology to search, filter, and select the literature
Selection step Articles 2003–2018 Articles 
2019–
2020
Step 1: Search using Google Scholar (GS) using the keyword “phishing” and a 
filter for the time frame. Only the first 1000 search results were considered
37,300 13,000
Step 2: Remove patents, duplicates, and publications without publisher or 
source
726 607
Step 3: Determine whether the content is usable by considering publication 
titles and, if non-conclusive, abstracts, and conclusions
81 67
Step 4: Apply paper quality control filters 77 47
Step 5: Manually check the remaining publications for valuable content 67 A 37 B
Total number of publications included in the survey: A + B → 104
1 IEEExplore: https ://ieeex plore .ieee.org.
2 ACM Digital Library: https ://dl.acm.org.
3 ScienceDirect: https ://www.scien cedir ect.com.
4 Wiley Online Library: https ://onlin elibr ary.wiley .com.
5 GS: https ://schol ar.googl e.com.
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In the initial search engine test, the keywords “anti-phishing training” has been used. 
As this query returned only 406 publications, we expanded the search by using a more 
general keyword: “phishing”. We ensure that the publications remain relevant with a 
15-year date filter (2003 to 2018) that we added to the query. This search returned 
37,300 results, of which GS returned the first 1000 publications, sorted by relevance. 
GS ranks the list of results by weighting the full text of each document, where it was 
published, by whom it was written, and how often as well as how recently it has been 
cited in other literature [46]. As an additional check, the other search engines queried 
in the initial search test were also queried using the new keyword, whereupon IEEEx-
plore returned 1040 publications, ACM Digital Library 1148, ScienceDirect 2678 and 
Wiley Online Library 1241. As GS does not provide a way to export search results, the 
tool Publish or Perish was used to perform this task [47].
Step 2 involved the application of a generic filter to the data set obtained in Step 1 
to focus on scholarly publications with complete identifier data. In that regard, we 
removed publications for which GS could not identify a publisher or source. Moreo-
ver, we applied a filter that removed patents.
In Step 3, we used the publication title as the primary indicator of whether it is 
relevant to the focus of this paper. First, we conducted a keyword search with the fol-
lowing keywords: Awareness, training, phishing, susceptibility, and behavior. In case 
one of the keywords was found within the title, we directly selected it for Step 4. If we 
did not find any of the keywords, we examined the abstract and the conclusion of the 
paper. If the abstract or the conclusion of the paper had a focus of anti-phishing train-
ing, we selected it for Step 4. The remaining steps constituted a progressive identifica-
tion process (elimination according to various attributes such as being peer-reviewed 
and the level of relevance) for the list of publications.
In Step 4, we applied an attribute-based approach to filtering to the list from Step 3 
for quality control in terms of peer reviewing and experiment design. We applied the 
following quality criteria in this step: 
1. Peer-reviewed: To ensure the quality and reliability of our survey’s conclusions, only 
peer-reviewed papers are considered
2. Target study group size: Works presenting conclusions based on a low participant 
number n in their studies ( n < 20 ) are not included (see Table 3 for further details)
Table 3 Overview of  the  number of  participants in  surveyed publications, grouped 
into the ranges very large, large, medium, small and not applicable 
Not applicable means that no experiments were performed. For example, such a paper could be a survey
Name Number of participants Amount Publications
Very large ≥ 10,000 6 [48–53]
Large 1000–9999 18 [30, 54–70]
Medium 100–999 32 [21, 22, 25, 26, 71–98]
Small 20–99 23 [41, 99–120]
Not applicable – 25 [11, 16–18, 20, 23, 24, 121–138]
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3. Control group: All publications that involve actual participant training have to make 
use of a control group to verify their findings against participants who do not undergo 
any training
4. Language: Only publications in English are considered
The final step, Step 5, requires the most effort, as it is in this stage that the list of publica-
tions identified in Step 4 are thoroughly evaluated and selected due to their merit. In this 
step, each remaining paper was examined, read, and reviewed to determine whether it 
offers relevant contributions to the focus of the present study.
For the second iteration, we applied the same steps, but for the time between 2019 to 
2020. Finally, the merger of the two result sets provided us the surveyed paper base.
Limitations of survey methodology Identifying studies for potential inclusion in a liter-
ature survey is a process wherein limits and boundaries have to be set carefully. Depend-
ing on the adopted data collection guidelines, a comprehensive overview of the existing 
literature should be provided in survey work, although such an overview is usually not 
exhaustive in terms of coverage. For our work, GS was used as the search engine of 
choice. Since the engine already returned many relevant publications (e.g., 37,300 results 
for 2003–2018 period), no additional searches (e.g., backward/forward citation searches) 
were performed. Such complementary methods may have led to the identification of 
additional articles; thus, some relevant articles may have been omitted due to the meth-
odology in the present study, which was based on keyword searches. However, consider-
ing the vast body of articles evaluated and the fact that the rating system of GS considers 
both relevance and impact, we believe that this work presents a comprehensive study 
and contributes to research on anti-phishing training.
Categories
We divide the selected publications into multiple categories, each of which covers one 
or multiple core area(s), which were identified by examining those works. A paper can 
appear in multiple categories should its results cover more than one area/factor. For a 
better overview of the approach to categorization described in the following sections, all 
papers, along with their corresponding categories, are presented in Table 4. We compare 
the results of a reviewed paper with those of other studies in the same category. There-
fore, the objective of the comparative analysis conducted in this paper is to identify con-
tradictory findings and evaluate consistency with other findings and conclusions.
Table 4 Overview of all the publications analyzed in this survey
Category Amount Publications
Training impact 35 [16, 21, 22, 24, 30, 41, 50, 51, 53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 80, 82, 
91, 92, 99, 101, 102, 104, 107, 109, 110, 114, 116, 122, 125, 126]
Target group impact 53 [21, 25, 30, 48, 49, 52, 54–56, 59, 65, 66, 70, 72–75, 77–86, 88–90, 93, 94, 
97–101, 103–107, 112, 113, 115, 116, 118, 125, 127, 131, 136, 137, 138]
Email content and structure 24 [17, 18, 50, 55, 62, 63, 68, 79, 84, 87, 91, 95, 96, 111, 119, 120, 124, 
127–130, 133, 134, 136]
Feedback 23 [21–26, 30, 41, 50, 55, 57, 62, 64, 75, 82, 84, 101–103, 108, 121, 132, 135]
Knowledge retention 12 [21, 23, 24, 55, 57, 61, 69, 75, 82, 109, 110, 128]
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Research results concerning phishing mostly address either attack success rates or train-
ing effects. For example, a work stating that emails containing links in a specific format are 
more successful would fall into the former group while another describing an educational 
game and the effects thereof on the participants would belong to the latter. In our categori-
zation, the second and third categories in Table 4 include papers concerning attack success 
rate, while the others address training effects. Both of these groups are crucial since they 
render the inherent factors on anti-phishing training design and effectiveness by jointly 
illustrating aspects of susceptibility, attack success, and training efficiency.
Our classification does not cover all possible relevant features of an anti-phishing cam-
paign. In the context of this survey, we identify the dominant ones and restrict the analy-
sis to them in the interests of concision and clarity. We list all categories and provide brief 
descriptions of the data that are covered by them:
•  Training impact contains data concerning the training effects after exposing users to 
anti-phishing training. The key questions are related to the benefits of training: Is edu-
cating users a viable approach? Does it help at all, or should the focus of IT personnel be 
on other phishing defense strategies?
•  Target group impact contains findings regarding which users exhibit a better or worse 
ability to identify phishing threats and whether this ability changes as a result of anti-
phishing training. This data can be used to find weak links within an organization and 
direct increased training efforts towards strengthening them.
•  Email content and structure includes data related to the design and structure of phish-
ing emails. The essential questions concern the visual appearance of such emails and 
how it is designed, the content and how (URLs) can make it easier or more difficult for 
users to determine the legitimacy of a phishing email.
• Feedback contains information concerning the design of the web pages for phishing 
attacks and the phishing training material. Moreover, it contains findings of possible 
ways to present educational material and how effective these are.
• Knowledge retention includes findings of how long the knowledge gained through 
educational measures is retained, how effective it is, and in which intervals users should 
be retrained.
Literature analysis
In this section, we present the analysis of surveyed works structured into the categories 
defined in our methodology. In each category, we employ a consistent approach to structur-
ing our review of the literature: A discussion of related works follows a short introductory 
section; after that, a concise analysis of the findings of each study is performed to identify 
any common traits and to draw conclusions. This presentation pattern is intended to make 
the literature review and analysis more accessible for the reader.
Impact of anti-phishing training
Introduction
A fundamental question concerning the design and structure of training programs is 
whether or not they have a measurable impact on employee behavior with regard to 
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phishing emails. In the following survey segment, we first discuss those studies that 
report a positive effect of anti-phishing training measures. We then conclude the survey 
by reviewing literary sources that report mixed results. As an important note, the list of 
papers obtained through the selection process does not contain any papers that report 
negative results only.
Survey
There is a large body of publications that confirm a decreased likelihood that users 
will fall victim to phishing messages after educating them with general anti-phishing 
material or via embedded training. The latter is a training method that is seamlessly 
integrated into a user’s typical workflow. Embedded training usually works along the fol-
lowing lines: A training system sends artificial phishing emails to a set of trainees. The 
trainees have to identify and report those emails when they process their emails during 
a typical workday. In contrast to controlled training environments, embedded training 
occurs under realistic settings in which trainees might be affected by factors such as dis-
tractions, stress, and a lack of focus. Should a trainee click on the link in the phishing 
email, he or she will fail the training and receive some kind of education (see “Feedback” 
section).
In [104], Neupane et  al. conducted a multi-modal neurophysiological study regard-
ing phishing detection and malware warnings. In regards to the participants’ trainabil-
ity, the authors found that their users were paying attention to the information provided 
and made active efforts while performing the assigned tasks. Based on these results, the 
authors conclude that the participants in their study did not ignore provided training 
materials and that training is indeed a valuable approach to address phishing. In the 
same vein, Halevi et al. confirmed that awareness, which often increased due to training, 
helped their participants not to fall victim to phishing as the subjects were more con-
cerned about protecting themselves [107]. In [101], Greene et al. examined long-term, 
operationally-situated data that was captured during embedded phishing awareness 
training exercises held throughout four and a half years at a U.S. government institu-
tion. Apart from an improved phishing detection rate, the authors also observed new 
competition due to the gamification of the phishing awareness training exercises over 
the years. Participants would attempt to beat their colleagues and be the first to iden-
tify the phishing emails, which possibly improved the training results further. Doge et al. 
[71] report similar success when using embedded training. In an experiment with three 
groups of approximately 300 participants each, the first group was exposed to embedded 
training, the second group received a notification after falling victim to a phishing email, 
and the third was the control group which was not exposed to training. Their results 
indicate that over a period of 10 days, there was no significant difference in terms of 
susceptibility among the three groups. However, over a more extended period (63 days 
in this experiment), training was found to result in significant improvements for the par-
ticipants’ clicking behavior. Of the participants who received training, 24.5% failed the 
experiment. Of those participants who received feedback alone, 32.08% failed, and, in 
the group that received neither feedback nor training, 47.5% failed.
A more recent work by Gordon et al. is a retrospective study of employee susceptibil-
ity at six US health care institutions. In this multicenter study, phishing simulations (95 
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campaigns) were run from 2011 to 2018, with 3 million phishing emails sent to employ-
ees of those organizations. Overall click rates varied by institution but were notably high: 
on average, around 400,000 (14%) of simulated emails were clicked on by employees. in 
their work, repeated phishing campaigns were associated with reduced odds of clicking 
on subsequent phishing emails. In models adjusted for several potential confounders, 
including year, the institutional campaign number, institution, and email category, the 
odds of clicking on a phishing email were 0.511 lower for 6 to 10 campaigns at an institu-
tion and 0.335 lower for more than 10 campaigns at an institution. They also found that 
there were important institutional differences in click rates, as well as differences in click 
rates between email category and season. Other papers included in this study that report 
the embedded training method having a positive effect are [21, 22, 24, 41, 82, 99, 109, 
110].
Papers that report mixed results but that are partially in favor of a positive effect of 
anti-phishing training are [50, 55, 72, 76, 80, 126]. In [76], Orunsolu et  al. examined 
the effectiveness of the security tips provided by a Nigerian bank to their customers 
as a form of education. These messages provide information on how users can identify 
online scams and which actions users should avoid. The authors’ findings showed that 
most participants were unable to reliably identify a phishing email despite having been 
exposed to the security tips. After this test, the authors performed a course-based train-
ing session, and, in the follow-up test, participants exhibited an increased success rate in 
identifying phishing threats. In [55], Caputo et al. obtained mixed results in their study 
regarding the impact of anti-phishing training. They found that the phishing detection 
rate of members of two groups, whom they referred to as “all clickers” and “non-click-
ers” did not improve at all, as they always (11%) or never (22%) clicked, regardless of 
the applied training method. Additionally, the authors grouped the remaining 67% into a 
group they called “inexplicable.” Users in this group seem to click or not click on phish-
ing links randomly. Nevertheless, the authors note that phishing messages that are not 
detected by technological solutions are often identified as a result of company personnel 
reporting an email as being suspicious. According to Caputo et al., providing a report-
ing feature should be considered as a possible additional layer in a company’s phishing 
defense system, mainly, as early reports provide meaningful benefits for members of 
an organization’s incident response team. Karakasiliotis et  al. [126] conducted a study 
to assess end-user awareness of social engineering and phishing. They conclude that a 
need for increased security awareness is evident but designing a generalized approach to 
achieving such awareness could be a complicated process due to the technical unfamili-
arity of users or behavioral differences among them.
Vishwanath et al. [80] developed a methodology for determining why so many users 
fall victim to phishing and why this seems to occur on a random basis. They report that 
a user’s susceptibility to phishing depends on multiple factors, only one of which can be 
trained using the embedded training technique. However, using the method developed 
by the authors, security officers can identify the weak links within their organizations; 
in addition, it enables them to determine how much training an employee requires and 
to set the focus of the training. Siadati et al. [50] found that training participants using 
persuasive phishing emails significantly improves their average resilience to such emails. 
In contrast, training involving emails that were not considered to be very persuasive had 
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little impact on the phishing susceptibility of the investigated users. Finally, Moody et al. 
[72] report that even with education, users are still overconfident in their ability to detect 
phishing messages. This overconfidence can, however, be diminished through education.
Summary
As multiple research studies show, an increased ability to correctly handle phishing 
emails after receiving anti-phishing training is well supported in the scientific commu-
nity. However, Caputo et al. identified two groups of users who were not affected by the 
applied training: those who clicked all links and those who never clicked. However, the 
authors did not address how these groups should be educated.
While most studies have attempted to answer the question of whether training makes 
trainees less susceptible to phishing attempts, little information is available concerning 
how such training changes their behavior regarding benign emails. Three notable excep-
tions are [30, 75, 102]. In [75], Kumaraguru et al. report that embedded anti-phishing 
training does not affect users’ willingness to click on links in benign emails [75]. How-
ever, this is in contrast with the findings of Sheng et  al., who report that some users 
stopped clicking on legitimate links in emails when the design of the provided training 
materials did not take such behavior into account. Unfortunately, the authors did not 
identify the type of design that could achieve this outcome [30]. The finding of Sheng 
et al. is confirmed by Yang et al. [102], which confirms that this issue should be given 
special attention.
Another intriguing issue is raised by a literature survey conducted by Khonjii et  al. 
[122]. They conclude that user education has a positive impact, but they criticize the fact 
that none of the reviewed studies evaluates whether such improvement is still meaning-
ful when considering different technical phishing-detection solutions. If there are solu-
tions that can filter all but those emails with which users struggle to identify, training 
would not provide any benefits even after appropriate anti-phishing training.
In summary, these mostly positive results indicate that anti-phishing training indeed 
has a positive impact. However, training design, especially complementing embedded 
training with standard training sessions and even individualization of training, might 
also play an important role.
Target group impact
Introduction
Findings in this category feature works that are related to user-specific properties. For 
example, they may note that users working in technical jobs are as likely to fall victim 
to phishing as others. Such insights are critical for identifying groups of users who are 
more susceptible to phishing. Employees in such groups could accordingly receive addi-
tional training or receive different types of training to mitigate possible attacks.
In this part, we focus on the properties presented in Table 5, and we use it as a guide 
for the discussion of the works considered in this section. More specifically, we first dis-
cuss all of the works included in the column titled Has impact and then those included 
in the No impact column. Within a column, we start with the papers listed for the first 
parameter and then continue row by row. However, as most papers present findings 
concerning more than one parameter and discussing the same paper in multiple places 
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makes little sense, we also discuss the findings related to other parameters on the first 
mention of a source. As a consequence, when we follow the order of the parameters, 
only papers that have not yet been introduced will be discussed.
Survey
Papers reporting impact In [75], Kumaraguru et  al. report on an experiment in a uni-
versity setting. They find that participants between the ages of 18 to 25 are consistently 
more vulnerable than other age groups. Sheng et  al. confirm the same finding in [75] 
regarding this age group. Furthermore, Sheng et al. state that the results of their role-
playing online survey instrument-based study involving 1001 participants suggest that 
women are more susceptible to phishing, probably because they have undergone less 
technical training [30].
Another study that points in the same direction as Sheng et al. is by Jagatic et al. [56]. 
The authors tested students and found that a phishing mail was slightly more likely to be 
successful when the sender was of the opposite gender to the receiver. In [78], Iuga et al. 
consider relationships between the demographic characteristics of individuals and their 
ability to correctly identify a phishing attack, as well as the impact of time-related fac-
tors. Their results suggest that gender and the number of years of computer usage expe-
rience have a statistically significant impact on the phishing detection rate; the same can 
be observed for the psychological anchoring effect.
Halevi et al. [107] studied the impact of gender, awareness of cyber-risks, and personal 
traits on spear-phishing susceptibility. They used a combination of a questionnaire and 
a real-world phishing simulation and found that women are more likely to respond to 
spear-phishing messages about winning a prize than men and that people who are more 
Table 5 User-specific properties and their impact on susceptibility to phishing attacks
Statements in the remarks column are our interpretation of the documented impact/no impact situations
Parameter Has impact No impact
Age [30, 52, 59, 65, 75, 98] [21, 48, 99]
Gender [30, 52, 56, 59, 78, 100, 105, 107] [21, 25, 48, 
54, 65, 66, 
99]
Technicality [59, 65, 66, 70, 88, 93, 100, 125] [81, 82]
Extrovert personality [125] –
Known sender address [72, 131] –
High use of online activities [72] [49]
Email experience [80, 83–85] –
Submissiveness [73, 83] –
Awareness level [48, 70, 74, 77, 80, 84, 86, 107] [66]
Conscientiousness [90, 107, 125, 131] –
Attention control/impulsivity [72, 84, 104, 127] –
Trust in technological solutions [74, 101] –
Risk awareness [70, 72, 89, 90, 94, 97, 100, 112] –
Confidence [74, 86, 90] –
Willingness [86, 100, 105, 106, 115] –
Commitment level [73] –
Distrust/fear/anxiety [106] [113]
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aware of cyber-risks are less susceptible to such attacks. Concerning personality traits, 
Halevi et al. found that less suspicious/aware online users are more likely to fall victim to 
phishing and that conscientiousness can be targeted by attackers to gain a higher phish-
ing response rate. They suggest that, based on their findings, a user-targeted approach to 
phishing defense may be required.
Flores et al. [100] conducted a study with a focus on targeted phishing attacks. Their 
results contradict the previously discussed findings concerning the impact of gender 
as they found that women are less susceptible to phishing attacks. Furthermore, the 
authors report that an individual’s trust and risk behavior significantly affected his or 
her actual behavior during the phishing experiment. Specifically, computer experience 
at work and willingness to help showed a significant correlation with the participant’s 
phishing susceptibility.
Hong et  al. [105] aimed to identify user profiles that can be used to predict when 
phishing attacks will be successful. They sought to identify attributes that make some 
individuals more vulnerable to phishing attacks than others. Their results suggest that 
gender, trust, and personality are among those attributes.
Another user-specific property is the technical background of a person and the degree 
to which his or her job is technical. Butavicius et al. conducted two experiments: In the 
first, they did not tell the participants to be aware of phishing emails, whereas, in the 
second, they did [125]. They found that computer-savvy participants were more vulner-
able to phishing attacks; however, this was only found to be the case in the informed 
experiment. In the non-informed experiment, they performed similarly to the other par-
ticipants. Also, by comparing their results with those of a prior personality test [139], 
Butavicius et  al. found that participants in the non-informed experiment performed 
better in terms of detecting phishing emails when they had more extroverted or open 
personalities. The same was found for less impulsive people in the non-informed experi-
ment. The authors inferred that those participants who probably deliberated over a 
phishing email appeared to demonstrate better performance in detecting phishing 
emails [125]. More support for the impact of a person’s technical knowledge comes from 
Flores et  al. [70], who investigated the correlation among selected psychological and 
demographic factors.
Furthermore, to assess the impact of national culture on these correlations, they per-
formed an experiment involving 2099 employees of nine organizations in Sweden, the 
USA, and India. It was found that general information security awareness, formal infor-
mation security training, and computer experience showed a positive correlation with 
phishing resilience. However, the authors also observed that the behavior demonstrated 
in response to phishing differs among Swedish, US, and Indian employees.
Parsons et  al. [88] present another interesting finding concerning the impact of the 
participant’s technical knowledge. They report that whether or not participants are 
aware that they are participating in a phishing study might have a significant impact 
on the outcome of such a study. Participants who were informed that they were par-
ticipating in a phishing study demonstrated significantly better performance in terms of 
identifying phishing emails and took longer to make decisions. Intriguingly, participants 
who had formal training in information systems (technicality) performed more poorly 
overall.
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The impact of trust in a sender’s email address was the subject of research con-
ducted by Moody et  al. [72]. Their results show that users’ susceptibility tends to 
increase when the sender of a possibly fraudulent email is known and reduces if the 
sender is unknown. The results indicate that users are more likely to click on a link 
in an email should they believe that the sender is deceitful. This behavior could be 
caused by the users’ desire to discover the true intentions of the sender. Also, the 
authors state that users who frequently browse the Internet are more likely to click on 
links in emails than others.
Alseadoon et al. performed a simulated phishing attempt and applied the detection 
deception model [137] developed by Wright et al. to determine which individuals are 
more susceptible to phishing. The authors of this study conclude that users who have 
less email experience and high levels of submissiveness are more likely to fall victim 
to phishing [83]. Harrison et al. [84] observed that individual factors such as knowl-
edge and experience with email increase resilience to phishing attacks. The focus was 
on the characteristics of phishing emails, users’ knowledge of and experience with 
phishing, and how these factors interact and influence how users cognitively process 
phishing emails. It was found that phishing susceptibility can be predicted by a par-
ticular combination of a user paying little attention to some aspects of an email and a 
high degree of elaboration on the part of the phishing message.
However, email experience, especially in the form of personal email habits and pro-
cessing strategies, might also have a negative impact. Vishwanath et al. [85] compared 
the causes and consequences of email habits and cognitive processing. The results of 
their simulated phishing attack indicate that the cumulative effects of heuristic pro-
cessing and email habits were the main factors affecting the phishing susceptibility, 
as they were found to cause a fourfold increase in a user falling victim to a phishing 
attempt and, therefore, nullify any advantage offered by systematic processing [85].
According to the study conducted by Workman [73], people who are more trusting 
and obedient to authority are more susceptible to social engineering. Furthermore, the 
author found that people with higher normative, effective, and continuance commit-
ments are more likely to fall victim to phishing attacks. Normative commitment refers 
to the formation of implied obligations to others. Continuance commitment refers to 
becoming emotionally invested in a decision, and affective commitment means that peo-
ple model the behaviors of other groups, role models, or important persons.
One parameter that is mentioned in many studies is the impact of people’s level of 
awareness. In [77], the authors conducted a phishing exercise in an academic environ-
ment as part of an ongoing information security awareness project. They found that 
educational and awareness activities pertaining to email environments are critical in 
managing the increased threat of identity theft. Another study pointing in a similar 
direction is that of [86], in which the authors use signal detection theory to measure vul-
nerability to phishing attacks, including variation in performance across task conditions. 
They found that phishing-related decisions are sensitive to individuals’ response bias, 
confidence, detection ability, and perception of consequences (awareness). Specifically, 
higher sensitivity was found to be positively correlated with confidence, while greater 
willingness to treat emails as legitimate was negatively correlated with the perceived 
consequences of participants’ actions and positively correlated with confidence.
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Arachchilage et  al. [112] developed a new game design that educates users about 
phishing. Their study results showed a significant improvement in participants’ phishing 
avoidance behavior in the second test assessment conducted by the authors. The find-
ings suggest that participants’ threat perception, safeguard effectiveness, self-efficacy, 
perceived severity of a potential threat, and perceived susceptibility elements positively 
impact threat avoidance behavior, whereas safeguard cost had a negative impact.
Abbasi et al. [74] confirm that awareness is an important factor, but only one of many. 
Nearly two-thirds of the users in their study fell victim to the phishing mail created 
by the authors. A cluster analysis of the collected data, which was obtained via ques-
tionnaire and phishing simulation, found that, among other factors, over-confidence, a 
low awareness level, and a high level of trust in technology on the part of the user were 
detrimental.
In [80], Vishwanath et al., the authors found that a user’s awareness level is of similar 
importance. They observed that research related to human factors and their impact on 
phishing victimization generally identifies two main sets of factors: The first set is the 
victim’s cognitive processing schema, which is influenced by his or her awareness of the 
safety of engaging in certain online activities. The second set of factors is the behavior 
rituals developed by a user based on the work cultures experienced and/or the types of 
communication devices used. Based on these findings, the authors developed the Sus-
picion Cognition Aromaticity Model (SCAM) model, which is presented in Fig.  4. It 
describes the likelihood of such victimization of an employee based on the following five 
parameters: individual beliefs concerning cyber-risk, both heuristic and systematic pat-
terns exhibited while processing an email, deficient self-regulation, and developed email 
habits. As the SCAM was developed to include all of these parameters, it uses experi-
ential, dispositional, behavioral, and cognitive factors to provide a more comprehensive 
explanation of the phishing victimization process. Vishwanath presented a proposal con-
cerning how to apply the SCAM for practical use at Blackhat 2016, where he presented 
how one can calculate the Cyber Risk Index (CRI).
Cyber Risk
Believes
Deficient Self-
Regulation
Heuristic
Processing
Systematic
Processing
Email
Habits
Suspicion
Phishing
Victimization
Demographics: Age, 
income, education, sex
Knowledge: experience, 
training
Cultural Influence:
Uncertainty avoidance
factors, interpersonal trust
Industry Patterns
E-Mail content and
structure: design, topic
Fig. 4 The Suspicion Cognition Automaticity Model (SCAM) [80]
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Vishwanath et  al. propose a questionnaire with 40 questions, the result of which is 
used as an input for the algorithm in Fig. 5. First, the algorithm asks the user about his 
or her cyber-risk beliefs. If these beliefs are faulty, they will have to be changed. If they 
are reasonable, the user’s phishing email identification heuristics are checked. Should a 
user exhibit poor heuristics, the algorithm will suggest teaching better heuristics. How-
ever, should a user apply good heuristics but process emails inadequately, anti-phishing 
training should be applied. Moreover, even if an employee passes all of these checks, he 
or she may still fail to identify a phishing email due to bad habits, which would also have 
to be remedied.
In their multi-modal neuro-physiological study, Neupane et  al. [104] found in their 
multi-modal neuro-physiological study that their participant’s personality traits, spe-
cifically attention control, directly impacted their phishing detection accuracy. The 
authors conclude that users may better detect phishing attacks if they could, in addition 
to undergoing phishing awareness training, be trained to exercise attention control. The 
authors note, however, that further work is necessary to understand the effect of such 
interventional training on the user’s performance in phishing detection tasks.
In [127], Butavicius et al. point in a similar direction by reporting that the participants 
in their study who were less impulsive in terms of decision-making were more likely to 
consider the links in phishing emails as being dangerous. Based on that observation, the 
authors state that a lower level of cognitive impulsivity could protect against spear phish-
ing. In addition, they found that lower cognitive impulsivity did not adversely influence 
the participant’s judgment of genuine emails.
The study conducted by Welk et al. confirm the results of the study by Butavicius et al. 
related to impulsivity [106]. Welk et al. aimed to determine how individual differences 
relate to performance on a phishing task by having undergraduate students complete 
Cyber risk beliefs
Heuristics
Systematic
Processing
Habits
Yes
No
Change beliefs
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Better heuristics
Education
Habit change
faulty
poor
inadequate
bad
Fig. 5 Algorithm developed by Vishwanath et al., which was presented at Blackhat 2016 and determines 
why users potentially fall victim to phishing and what training should focus on
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a questionnaire and an email task in which they had to discriminate between legiti-
mate emails and phishing attempts. The results indicated that certain trust, personal-
ity and impulsivity predictors were linked with accuracy in terms of detecting phishing 
attempts: personality characteristics that support reserved behavior, low impulsivity and 
distrust decreased phishing susceptibility in an email-based decision-making task.
Papers reporting no impact [99], Zielinska et  al. conducted a questionnaire-based 
study with 96 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The study did not 
find any differences in age or gender in terms of susceptibility to phishing.
Similar findings were obtained in a study conducted by Kumaraguru et  al. [21] that 
analyzed data from 42 participants and a study by Mohebzada et al. [48] involving 10,000 
participants. However, instead of age and gender, [48] report that awareness is a critical 
parameter, as 10% of the users investigated in their study fell victim to phishing. Benen-
son et al. investigated whether there is a statistical correlation between the following fac-
tors and the click rate on phishing links:
• Gender of the sender and receiver
• Subjects are friends on Facebook
• Sender has a publicly available Facebook profile
• Receiver has knowledge that emails can be spoofed
• Receiver knows that clicking on links in emails can be dangerous
Their results show no significant statistical correlation between these factors and the 
clicking behavior  [54]. Karumbaiah et  al. [25] found the same for gender but also the 
personal traits of trust and perceived internet risk.
Another adverse finding concerning user properties has been reported by Leukfeldt 
et al. [49]. Their study shows that frequently engaging in online activities such as partici-
pating in chat rooms, gaming, actively using forums or engaging in high-visibility social 
networking is not correlated with an individual’s susceptibility to phishing; furthermore, 
operating system or browser affinity was not found to be correlated with their phishing 
susceptibility as well.
The last no-impact findings concern the parameter of the technical complexity of an 
individual’s job. In [82], Kumaraguru et al. find that employees working in technical and 
non-technical jobs exhibit similar susceptibility to phishing. This is confirmed by [81], 
who states that even educated users can fall victim to phishing as their detection ability 
alone may not be enough to prevent an attack. The authors also argue that contextual 
factors indirectly influence phishing susceptibility. They conclude that individuals fall 
victim to phishing attempts due to their lack of cognitive involvement rather than an 
inability to detect phishing.
Summary
Table  5 summarizes what the surveyed body of work reports regarding the impact or 
lack thereof user-specific properties. One key observation is that, with the exceptions of 
the properties age, gender, frequent engagement of online activities, and job technicality, 
the answer to the question of whether or not a parameter has an impact on susceptibil-
ity to phishing attacks seems quite clear. However, especially for properties that were 
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discussed by only one of the publications, the observation should be taken with a grain 
of salt.
As many parameters have been identified as impacting susceptibility to phishing 
attacks and given that there may be many more, an efficient approach could be to start 
training all employees using the same framework. In a subsequent step, a training regime 
(i.e., differentiation) could then be developed based on their response to training and 
progress using models such as the SCAM or the CRI proposed by Vishwanath et al. [80].
Email content and structure
Introduction
This section covers essential aspects one should consider when designing and populat-
ing a phishing email to use in anti-phishing training exercises. Such aspects could the 
email’s visual appearance, how the link Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is masked, or 
the content’s context (see Fig. 7). Multiple studies have investigated how these properties 
influence the success rate of phishing emails. Analyzing these results enables the crea-
tion of synthetic phishing emails with varying levels of difficulty in terms of detection.
Survey
Siadati et  al. [50] conducted a study on how the content of a phishing email impacts 
its success. They investigated which topics were more appealing to the participants in 
their study, as well as whether more persuasive content influences the outcome of phish-
ing attempts. The results clearly show that persuasive emails do, indeed increase the 
Fig. 6 Click-through value ranges for the phishing emails used in [50]
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success rate. Moreover, the following five email topics were identified as the most effec-
tive (see Fig. 6 for more details): shipping, order, received fax email template #1, received 
fax email template #2 and complaints. In Fig. 6, the thinner bar shows the click-through 
rates of individual groups, while the thicker bar shows the range for a click-through 
rate of individual campaigns. Red dots show the weighted average click-throughs over 
the campaigns. On the other end of the spectrum, topics such as celebrity, sports, or 
newsletter are the least ineffective ones yielding meager click-through rates. The top-five 
most effective topics have more than twice the click-through rates than the immediately 
following topics. Caputo et al. observed no statistically significant difference in the click-
ing rate when exposing participants to email contents that the authors divided into the 
following categories: other gain, other loss, individual gain and individual loss [55]. For 
example, an email from the category other loss would state that another individual would 
suffer a financial loss should the recipient not click on the link provided.
Harrison et  al. [87] studied how perceptions of social presence in a phishing attack 
influence the victimization rate. In their experiment, their participants were subject to 
a simulated phishing attack in which the amount of social presence in the email used 
was varied. Their results show that richness cues in the email were heuristically rather 
than systematically processed and that these cues significantly increased the likelihood 
of successful victimization. The authors, therefore, conclude that the rich information 
in phishing emails triggered perceptions of social presence and that the resulting heu-
ristic evaluation increased the chances of victimization. Additionally, it appeared that 
once triggered, the perceived social presence of a phishing email not only reduced the 
users’ considerations of mediation but also indirectly increased the persuasiveness of the 
email.
In [136], Parsons et al. concluded that the participants in their study developed per-
sonal approaches to the categorization of emails. They tended to treat emails as if they 
were important, regardless of their actual legitimacy. For instance, emails from banks or 
government institutions were more likely to be considered as important and therefore 
treated as legitimate. Additionally, the authors conclude that the participants were more 
likely to fall victim to phishing emails if their content threatened a potential financial loss 
on the part of the receiver. A similar result was presented by Butavicius et al. [127], who 
found that the most effective social engineering strategy for influencing a user’s judg-
ment of a link was authority, while the least effective was social proof. Their participants 
were unable to reliably distinguish between spear phishing and legitimate emails when 
the emails contained a reference to an authority figure. Thus, the authors concluded 
that, in terms of judging an email’s legitimacy, the link destinations were unrelated to the 
actual content of an email. The study conducted by Jansen et al. investigated judgmental 
heuristics employed by users in evaluating the authenticity of messages [129]. Their par-
ticipants’ opinions about the validity of a website relied heavily on the presence of safety 
signs, such as a closed padlock symbol (presumably, however, they were unaware of how 
easily such a symbol can be faked). The study conducted by Dhamija et al. confirms this 
behavior [111].
In  [130], Parsons et  al. attempted to determine the best cues for identifying phish-
ing emails and whether users actually use them. The authors surveyed studies related 
to this question, compiled a list of cues identified therein, and organized their findings 
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into categories, as shown in Table 6. Because they found that all of the studies investi-
gated were based on participants self-reporting how they used these cues to distinguish 
between phishing and genuine emails, the authors performed experiments to measure 
the impact thereof empirically. They identified content consistency, link legitimacy, 
email personalization, and spelling as the best indicators. However, their results indicate 
that users often make their decisions based on poor indicators; for example, their partic-
ipants were influenced by the visual presentation of the email used. If the phishing email 
was visually more appealing (e.g., a professional-looking logo was present), they tended 
to make more accurate decisions concerning its legitimacy compared to emails with a 
poor visual presentation. Additionally, the authors found that participants were influ-
enced by the urgent tone of an email, as they seemed to perform the worst in that case.
Similarly, Benenson et al. [32] studied why users click on the links provided in phishing 
emails. The results indicate the following reasons: 34% of users stated that they opened 
emails due to curiosity concerning their content—For example, the content may have 
been related to the actual behavior or activities of the recipient, such as a link to photo-
graphs of a party. 27% of users opened emails to determine their validity. 17% of users 
opened as they claimed to know the sender of the email, even though the addresses were 
generated with a random name selector. 16% of the participants opened because they 
trusted the technical solutions in place to keep them safe. Figure 3 shows a tricky combi-
nation of content fits actual behavior or activities and curiosity.
The study [79], which focused on students, found an increased phishing success rate 
when emails that are as similar as possible to the original were used. Additionally, more 
users fell victim to phishing when the linked page was an identical clone of the expected 
original website. According to Afroz et al. [124], most users will consider a website and 
will provide the requested information, if what they see does not contradict their expec-
tations. The authors’ analysis revealed that over 90% of users use a website’s appear-
ance as an indication of its authenticity. The goal of an attacker would, therefore, be to 
design a phishing website in such a way that it is as close in appearance to the original as 
possible.
Table 6 Email cues identified in previous research by Parsons et al. [130]
Cue Description
Consistency Structure and focus of information
Links URL, https, address bar
Visual presentation Logos, banners, visual presentation, general design and look
Personalization Personalization of the content inc. language and content aspects
Security Security indicators and status bar
Spelling and grammatical errors Spelling and grammar (mistakes)
Legal Copyright information and legal disclaimers
Sender Sender, his or her address, contact methods
Familiarity Credibility and level of trust in source
Importance Rational appeals
Urgency Time pressure, overly urgent or forceful language/content
Positive and negative consequences Emotional and motivational appeals, premise of the appeal, 
underlying motive of the website (and potential incentives as 
positive consequence)
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There are also works focusing on the features of URLs embedded in phishing emails 
(see Fig. 7—items 4© and 5© ). Canova et al. [128] defined multiple categories, each of 
which includes several URL spoofing tricks; these are listed in Table 7. Their results 
indicate that URL categories 1, 2, and 7 were the easiest to identify, where types 5 and 
6 were the most difficult to spot and, therefore, the most successful. Subsequently, 
they published a follow-up study adding the results of a retention test conducted 5 
months after the initial training. The attack using well-hidden typos (category 6) was 
again the most successful, where over 60% of the participants were unable to identify 
the message as phishing. Furthermore, the authors report that including keywords 
such as “secure” in an URL and sub-domain tricks (see category 3) confused the par-
ticipants the most [128]. Andric et  al. [79] found that users demonstrated superior 
performance in terms of identifying phishing URLs and fake websites when they 
knew the correct URL and the protocol used by the original website.
There are also contradictory results in the literature concerning the effect of email 
content and structure. Harrison et  al. [84] designed multiple phishing emails, to 
which they added typographical/spelling errors. They found that all their efforts went 
Fig. 7 Example of a sample phishing email. 1© : Email subject, 2© : sender name and address, 3© : content 
area (can contain HTML code), 4© : link with hidden URL using HTML, 5© : actual URL of the link shown on 
mouse-over
Table 7 URL spoofing tricks categorized as described by Canova et al. [128]
Category Description Example
1 Internet Protocol (IP) address as URL, no brand http://130.82.162.6
2 Random/unrelated/trustworthy URL. Does not contain the 
company name.
http://accou nt.com
3 Random/unrelated/trustworthy URL. Company name at the 
place of the department.
http://paypa l.accou nt.com
4 Random/unrelated/trustworthy/IP domain. Company name 
at the place of the topic/path.
http://accou nt.com/www.paypa l.com
5 Derived domains: The who section seems similar to the the 
real URL but uses an additional term
http://faceb ook-login .com
6 URL that contains well-hidden typos http://www.twitt ter.com
7 URL in which chars are replaced by similar-looking letters 
and numbers
http://www.arnaz on.com
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completely unnoticed and subsequently did not affect either processing or suscepti-
bility to phishing.
Summary
In order to maximize the effectiveness of a phishing email, we could use a combination 
of the previously described study approaches. For example, the use of an extremely per-
suasive topic such as shipping or order, an email that looks identical to a regular email 
and an URL using spoofing tricks that fall into category 5 or 6 redirecting to a clone of 
the expected website is promising. Multiple studies found that the success rate of phish-
ing attempts improves when emails that are very similar to the original one are used. 
However, the study of Harrison et al. [84] found that spelling errors have no impact. This 
may be because people do not spot them. According to Rawlinson et al. [140], the human 
brain can read words with scrambled characters because it generally processes word fea-
tures through a classification/identification scheme. The brain can recognize a word as 
long as the beginning, and the end of the word remains intact, and the middle part of the 
word still contains the correct letter features, although they can be arranged indepen-
dently of their correct position. This leads to the assumption that the visual appearance 
of an email is more important than the words used, with the limitation that the topic 
and content must still match that expected of an email. To provide a concise overview, 
Table 8 summarizes all of the findings described in this section.
Feedback
Introduction
This category covers the design of learning materials, when or how educational docu-
ments are presented to participants, and how a training program should be designed. 
Potential approaches to education could include courses, repeatedly sending educational 
material to target users, or attempting actually to phish users and presenting the relevant 
training material thereafter. The latter method is referred to as embedded training in this 
work. This section is organized as follows: First, we present results regarding how the 
training itself should occur (e.g., if courses are a more effective form of training than just 
providing informative material via email). In the second part, we analyze publications 
studying the training materials themselves (e.g., how the documents should be struc-
tured or whether more graphics should be used than text).
Table 8 Email content and  structure parameters and  their impact on  the  success rate 
of phishing messages
Parameter Has impact No impact
Content Persuasive [50, 96], trust symbols [111, 120, 129], spelling 
[130], links [130], content consistency [130], personali-
zation [130], visual appearance [95, 119, 130], urgency 
[130], social presence [87]
Spelling errors [84], link destination [127]
Topic Shipping [50], order [50], received fax [50], complaint 
[50], banks [136], government institutions [136]
Other gain [55], other loss [55], indi-
vidual gain [55], individual loss [55]
Link URL Categories 5, 6 [128], same protocol [79], contains secure 
or similar terms [128]
Categories 1, 2, 7 [128]
Design Clone of original [79, 124] –
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Survey
a. Form of the training: Based on their results, Kumaraguru et  al. [82] suggest that 
users learn more effectively when the training materials are presented after the users 
have fallen victim to a simulated attack. The authors refer to this educational method 
as embedded training. Additionally, they also measured the average time the users 
spent reading the provided training materials. Participants in the embedded training 
group spent 97 s on average, whereas the non-embedded group spent 37 s. This result is 
reflected in data collected from recurring phishing tests: The adoption of the embedded 
approach results in an improved training effect. Al-Daeef et al. [23] also confirmed this 
finding by observing that users make better decisions concerning phishing emails after 
having to experience embedded training. Also, Kumaraguru et al. [21] did not observe 
a significant difference in phishing detection performance between the participants 
receiving non-embedded training and the members of the control group.
Offering personalized training is instrumental in increasing the effectiveness of the 
anti-phishing training program. The literature survey in [24] highlights the benefits of 
ongoing, embedded anti-phishing training for employees as such education will not be 
as detached from a user’s reality as, for instance, a dedicated course would. Schroeder’s 
suggestion is to implement training on a per-user basis with different difficulty levels. 
The author notes that incorporating personalized spaced repetition provides added ben-
efits for employees, as they receive the impression that the training has been customized 
to their needs. The participants would feel more engaged by the customized materials 
since they knew that the training was designed to provide them the ability to succeed. 
Mapping the learning tasks to each level would allow each participant to progress at his 
or her own pace. Users might stretch themselves to reach a higher level than they would 
in the absence of a personalized program.
Carella et  al. [22] confirmed that embedded training substantially outperforms no-
training and in-class training situations. However, the authors stated that in-class train-
ing has the most significant short-term impact. The high short-term training effect of 
in-class education was also observed by Karumbaiah et al. [25], who, in their research, 
concluded that users exposed to a high-quality anti-phishing training video were less 
likely to click on phishing links during a subsequent 30-min experiment than those 
exposed to other training methods.
The phishing type against which users should be trained also impacts the effectiveness 
of embedded training. Caputo et al. [55] studied embedded training for spear phishing 
and obtained mixed results. They concluded that the training was not as effective against 
spear-phishing as it was against general phishing. The authors speculated that the par-
ticipants might have perceived the provided information as “not credible, relevant or 
interesting”.
How phishing education is presented to users has a significant impact on how they 
react to it. Wang et al. [102] extended an email client with a phishing warning bar, which 
would warn the user should he or she receive suspicious emails. However, the results 
showed that many users did not notice the warning sign and fell victim to the phishing 
attempt. Akhawe et al. [121] conducted a large-scale study to investigate the impact of 
warning messages further and found that such messages can indeed be effective in prac-
tice. The authors evaluated browser telemetry data obtained from Mozilla and Google 
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and reached the following conclusion: When malware or phishing warnings were shown, 
only a quarter of the users ignored the warnings and continued to open the website. If, 
however, the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) warning page was displayed, more than 70% of 
users clicked through. The authors concluded that the experience of a user for a specific 
warning message has a significant impact on the click-through rate. According to Engel-
man et al., such warning messages must be designed such that they actively interrupt the 
user’s primary task, only pop up if necessary and require the user actually to read the 
message; besides, to be efficient, they should display clear and understandable choices 
[103].
b. Educational material: Kumaraguru et al. investigated whether users provided with 
text- or comic-based training materials exhibit different learning results in [75]. The par-
ticipant group provided with the comic-based materials achieved better results than with 
standard training methods. The authors subsequently improved their training materials 
even further by developing a game called “Anti-Phishing Phil”. Their results show that 
participants who played the game performed better in terms of identifying phishing 
URLs [57]. In a similar vein, Sheng et al. [30] studied and tested several anti-phishing 
materials, finding that there is no significant difference between the training effect of 
the materials as long as users are provided with at least one of them. A similar result was 
obtained by Jensen et al. [26], who concluded that training materials consisting of only 
text were as effective as those featuring a text-plus-graphics presentation method. Har-
rison et al. [84] suggest focusing the training on “refining the quality of initial attention 
to the email”, such as by teaching users to focus on a few key elements of an email (e.g., 
the existence of hyperlinks or verifying the sender’s email address). Greene et al. [101] 
analyzed the data of a 4.5-year-long embedded training-based phishing awareness pro-
gram. They found that the people who clicked on the simulated phishing messages tend 
to overestimate the technological phishing detection system of their company. There-
fore, they advise that companies should consider explicitly informing their employees 
that no technological solution is completely infallible. Promising training effects were 
identified in the results obtained by Siadati et al. [50], who developed a web-based inter-
active email client in which participants had to identify a certain number of suspicious 
elements to complete their training.
In their study, Kirlappos and Sasse [108] proposed that the way in which security 
education is designed should be revised. Their results show that materials provided to 
employees are largely ignored because they focus on indicators that users potentially 
do not understand or trust. Therefore, the authors propose offering different modules 
when implementing a training program, as they conclude that awareness, education, and 
training are three distinct steps in improving a user’s security competence.
Zikai et al. show in [117] an interactive form of awareness training with a role-play-
ing game. In their study, they compared their game to similar approaches and state that 
users learn the concepts of phishing better with playing their game than watching video 
material.
Summary
The effectiveness of anti-phishing training based on the embedded model has been 
successfully verified in the past. Ideally, such training should be designed on a 
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per-participant basis as an ongoing process within an organization, starting with an in-
class training seminar. Various types of training materials have been investigated, with 
mixed results being obtained (see Table 9), while one of the works considered that pro-
viding materials, regardless of their type, was the most important factor [30].
Knowledge retention
Introduction
This section covers works that investigate the impact of the anti-phishing training pro-
gram over time. It presents findings related to the question of whether a single train-
ing session is sufficient or whether recurring training sessions at certain frequencies are 
required to achieve and maintain a decreased likelihood of employees falling victim to 
phishing attacks.
Survey
There are various findings that support the view that an effective anti-phishing training 
program should consist of multiple recurring training sessions [21, 24, 55, 75]. However, 
findings regarding how long participants retain the knowledge obtained during training 
or how long the intervals before potential re-training sessions should be, differ. On three 
occasions, Kumaraguru et  al. concluded that users can retain learned content for at 
least 1 week [57, 82, 109]. On a similar time-scale, Jackson et al. [110] showed that users 
retained their anti-phishing knowledge up to 16 days after undergoing their first training 
session. Another study published by these authors titled “School of Phish: A Real-World 
Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Training”, confirmed knowledge retention even after 28 days 
[75].
The considered studies overwhelmingly conclude that training should be designed as 
an ongoing and integrated process. Employees should be able to train in a way that feels 
natural for them; for example, training could be integrated into their routine work activ-
ities. It was found in [23, 24] that, through ongoing anti-phishing training, click rates 
were reduced from 58 percent to single-digit percentages after the first training itera-
tion. In [24], Schroeder further advises choosing the training intervals on an individual 
basis per user depending on his or her educational progress. These intervals should, 
however, be determined in such a way that they do not annoy employees by resulting in 
excessively frequent scheduled training sessions; however, each user should be trained at 
Table 9 Impact of the form of the training and the educational material
Parameter More impact Less/no impact
Form of anti-phishing training
 Short-term training In-class [22, 25] –
 Long-term training Recurring [24] embedded training [21–24] –
 Warning messages Effective [121] if interrupting user [103] Toolbar [102]
Educational material
 Form Comic [26, 75], game [57, 117], text [26], does not 
matter [30]
Text [75]
 Content Key identifier [84], no technological solution is 
completely infallible [101]
–
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least four times a year. In a similar vein, Canova et al. [128] found a significant decrease 
in the performance of the participants in their retention study after 5 months.
Summary
As summarized in Table  10, all of the works considered in this survey agree on the 
notion that recurring training sessions must be scheduled to ensure that the learned 
anti-phishing knowledge is not forgotten. Unfortunately, the findings regarding knowl-
edge retention are not as clear. They suggest that the retention period is between 7 days 
and 5 months. Therefore, one should train all users at least once every 5 months even 
with an optimistic view on knowledge retention.
Discussion
Our literature analysis showed that anti-phishing training has a significant impact on 
user susceptibility to phishing attacks. It is, therefore, evident that any organization 
should have a valid and well-founded anti-phishing training program. However, a key 
question lingers: what should such a program look like?
Our comparative analysis of related works showed that the parameters and values 
listed in Table 11 are reasonably certain to have a positive impact when they are taken 
into consideration in a program’s design.
Based on these parameters, we first discuss how such training should look alike. After 
that, we consider the implications for tools that can be used to implement or facilitate 
Table 10 Knowledge retention summary
Parameter Value
Approach General recurring training [21, 24, 55, 75, 109], recur-
ring training individualized peruser [24]
Minimum interval Seven days [57, 82], 16 days [110], 28 days [75]
Maximum interval Set by management [24], less than five months [128]
Table 11 Proposed anti-phishing training program parameters
Parameter Section Value(s)
Susceptibility Target group impact Train everyone
User specific training Target group impact Use a model similar to Cyber Risk Index (CRI) to 
identify the appropriate training method
Email design Email content and structure 1:1 clone of the legitimate mail
Best email topics Email content and structure Shipping, orders, received fax
Email persuasiveness Email content and structure More = better
Education progression Email content and structure, Feedback Level system, per user
Level design Email content and structure, Feedback Increasing difficulty (see "Email content and 
structure" section)
Education form Feedback Initial course then ongoing training based on a 
user’s weaknesses as identified by the CRI
Feedback Feedback Embedded training, imminent
Training interval(s) Knowledge retention Adjusted to levels, min. 4×/year
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anti-phishing training. Finally, we conclude this section with a brief look at the current 
state of anti-phishing training tools.
Aspects of a well-founded anti-phishing training program
The reviewed body of work leaves little doubt that everyone is susceptible to phishing, 
to at least some degree. Therefore, every organization should have an anti-phishing 
training program. A valid and well-founded anti-phishing training program should start 
with a “kick-off course,” as training sessions organized as courses produce the highest 
short-term training effect. After this initial step, the participants of the program should 
be trained through embedded training. However, the reviewed literature suggests (see 
"Target group impact" section) that user-specific parameters such as age, gender, techni-
cal expertise, and personal traits have an impact on phishing susceptibility and on the 
type of training that yields the best results. A method such as the CRI could be used to 
determine how much and what type of training an employee needs.
Concerning embedded training, the training material must be displayed as soon as a 
mistake is made; for example, just after clicking a link in a phishing email. Alternatively, 
the presentation of the training material could be delayed until some additional steps are 
taken, for example, after credentials have been entered on a fake company login page. 
However, these cases are challenging, as, if the user clicks but does not enter his/her cre-
dentials, a training action might still be required if the phishing attempt could have been 
recognized based on the email content and link. The training material itself should pro-
vide information on why the user is being presented with that and how he or she could 
have recognized this instance of a phishing attempt. Moreover, if an employee does not 
click on the phishing email but does not report it either, he/she should receive training 
materials on how to report phishing emails and why this step is essential.
As shown in Table 11, according to the research findings in the literature, the email 
topics leading to the highest click rates are shipping, orders and received fax. However, 
this situation does not mean that only such emails should be used. According to the con-
text and training goals, it is also appropriate to use other topics or a mixture thereof, 
with those that have a higher impact being weighted more than others (see Table 8).
Each employee will most certainly have a different knowledge state before training. A 
possible solution for this problem could be to create multiple difficulty levels and allow 
users to progress through those individually. These levels would contain different sets 
of emails and landing pages, with their difficulties being adjusted based on the findings 
presented in “Email content and structure” section. If employees continuously exhibit 
the correct anti-phishing behavior, we could upgrade them directly to the next level. 
Alternatively, we could send them an email describing their success and offering the pos-
sibility of proceeding to the next level if desired.
To ensure that the gained anti-phishing knowledge is retained, a program should be 
designed as an ongoing process that is integrated into users’ daily workflow and mim-
ics actual attacks as closely as possible. Each user should be exposed to such training 
at least once every 5 months, but preferably four times a year. However, as the results 
regarding the ideal intervals between re-training sessions differ, one could experiment as 
suggested by Schroeder et al. [24]: The intervals should be chosen such that the users do 
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not get annoyed with excessively frequent retesting but still fulfill the requirements set 
by management.
Organizational aspect, perception and ethics
Although our conclusions may give the impression that intensive anti-phishing training 
should be implemented in any organization, there is also the organizational aspect of 
anti-phishing training regarding how such training might be perceived/taken up in dif-
ferent organizations.
Since organizations differ in their settings, security, and organizational cultures, 
the impact of a well-founded training programme may vary across companies. If, for 
instance, a company with a flat organizational structure and a very liberal work cul-
ture implemented embedded anti-phishing training, its employees could perceive the 
training as an observation tool. In contrast, in a bank, where each action taken by an 
employee might already be monitored, the likelihood of such impressions might be 
lower.
In any case, embedded training may increase the pressure on employees as, for vari-
ous reasons, they may not wish to fail the training procedure. Therefore, they might feel 
constantly tested or pressured by their employers, which could have an impact on their 
health and/or work performance. Thus, any security training, including phishing train-
ing, should be varied according to the needs, market pressures, modernization goals, 
prerequisites, and budget of a firm.
Additionally, it is crucial to consider the “security fatigue effect”, referring to the situ-
ation in which people (e.g., a company’s employees) become overwhelmed by and tired 
of the barrage of installed security warnings and regulations [141]. They are basically 
“drowned” in the ongoing flow of advice concerning how they should stay safe and keep 
constantly alert. With regards to anti-phishing training, each company has to consider 
for itself whether its employees are able to handle additional training or whether they 
would become overwhelmed. If, for example, a company already has security training 
programs in place, adding an anti-phishing training program might prove counterpro-
ductive in terms of security fatigue, and the desired security improvement effect might 
therefore not materialize.
Psychological aspects of training design
The psychology of end-users, the subjects to be trained to achieve higher phishing-
awareness, and attackers should be considered when devising effective anti-phishing 
training programs [142, 143].
Regarding the end-users, the literature review in "Literature analysis" section provides 
ample evidence that the exploitation of peculiarities of the human psyche is an impor-
tant factor for a successful phishing attack. Examples of such peculiarities are the almost 
blind trust in authority figures [127] and security symbols [129] or the lower attention to 
phishing in emails with an urgent tone [130]. One way to address this is to design train-
ing programs that do not only teach users how to recognize phishing emails but aim at 
altering the user’s problematic cognitive processes. Other end-user related psychological 
aspects are the different perception of training if it is detached from the user’s reality 
[24] or the personal relevance of the training material. The former can be addressed with 
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embedded training and the latter by adjusting the training method and material to dif-
ferent psychological profiles. However, the reviewed literature does not offer much guid-
ance on how these could be done.
Regarding the attackers, a better understanding of the psychology of attackers is cru-
cial in modeling adversary behavior and identifying the implicit factors that determine 
how deception and phishing strategies are employed in phishing emails in the first place 
[74, 144]. Currently, the psychology of criminal behaviors is usually neglected in the 
field of cybersecurity [143]. Nevertheless, target-adversary interactions and how they 
are driven as part of adversary strategies are important in facilitating realistic phishing 
simulations and, consequently, training tools. Therefore, researching the application and 
exploitation of psychological aspects in the design and development of anti-phishing 
training seems promising.
Implications for anti-phishing training tools
To achieve the training objectives described above, the proposed parameters in Table 11 
should be reflected in the design and capabilities of anti-phishing training tools. In addi-
tion, those tools should entail practical functions which enable the exploitation of these 
findings. More specifically, such tools should consider the following aspects:
Progression system: As each user must have the ability to progress at his or her own 
pace, the tool has to support some level-based progression system. The user is to be 
moved to a higher level automatically as soon as he or she has mastered the current one. 
Similarly, he or she could be placed at a lower level should he or she continuously fail to 
identify attacks at the present level of difficulty. For initial level positioning and train-
ing selection, the system could implement the CRI survey questions [80] and apply the 
algorithm developed by Vishwanath et al. to identify the appropriate training focus. Fur-
thermore, to identify personality traits and cognitive processes that potentially amplify 
a user’s susceptibility to phishing, a generic psychological questionnaire could be used. 
The level and progression of such users could then be adjusted according to the impact 
severity of their traits.
Emails: As users should be exposed to simulated phishing attacks of different difficul-
ties, email templates must be assignable to levels, or the tool should have a mechanism 
by which to automatically adjust the given template to a specific level. Such adjustments 
might include changing the URLs used, adding safety signs to the content like a closed 
padlock [129] or tweaking the other parameters described in "Email content and struc-
ture" section. Another desirable automation is to mutate the URLs used in a campaign 
to reflect different URL categories (see Table 6). To minimize the administrative efforts 
required, the system should be able to autonomously manage the URLs on the compa-
ny’s internal Domain Name System (DNS) server.
To further reduce the work time that an administrator has to devote to creating tem-
plates, a tool could additionally offer community template pools that enable users to 
exchange templates. This solution would allow it to exploit the power of numbers (i.e., 
to offer support mechanisms by which to share the workload among the members of 
a community). Another approach to improve efficiency is to share the load to create 
email templates for typical user groups in the academic community. However, a major 
challenge is to determine who should operate and manage this platform, as well as how 
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quality control for such a collaborative infrastructure should be implemented. Similar to 
the personality trait-based adjustments made in other parts of the training design, the 
emails should be adjusted based on the user’s specific traits. For example, people who 
tend to overlook details can be trained with emails that are only slightly different from 
genuine messages.
Automatic population of user database: The system should feature an active connec-
tion to the central employee database of the company. This allows the automatic popu-
lation of users during deployment or in the event of changes due to new requirements 
or role changes. The automatic inclusion of new employees is a particularly important 
requirement in terms of addressing vulnerabilities as fast as possible.
Feedback pages: The feedback page has to be adjusted according to the level a user is 
currently on. This means that it has to match the difficulty level of the simulated phish-
ing email sent to that user. For example, on easier levels, it should directly show the user 
how he or she could have identified the phishing email. For advanced levels, first, a fake 
website with a login form could be displayed; then, if the user enters his or her login 
details, the feedback page with the training material could be displayed. If information 
about the personality traits of the users is available, the system could display feedback 
pages that are more suitable for a specific user’s cognitive processing and the ability to 
assimilate information. For instance, if a user reacts better to graphical content, comic-
based feedback pages could be shown.
Retraining system: To support the knowledge retention of employees, the tool should 
automatically schedule retraining sessions for all users. This should be done in a way that 
depends upon the user’s current level, and it should feature some time randomization to 
prevent, for example, having all the phishing emails sent at 8 a.m. Additionally, similar 
to the progression system, if a generic psychological questionnaire is administered before 
the start of the training, the retraining-scheduling algorithm could take the user’s psy-
chological and cognitive traits into account as well. For instance, the retraining interval 
could be longer for users who exhibit traits that result in lower susceptibility.
Phishing email reporting system: If users spot a simulated phishing email in their 
inboxes, they must be provided with the ability to report this email as an instance of 
phishing. To support the principle of embedded training, which proposes training users 
in their working environments, this should be the same mechanism employees use to 
report real phishing threats. One such mechanism is forwarding the email to a special 
company email address; another is clicking on a “report email as phishing” button in the 
email client. Since offering the latter has become quite common in many email clients 
(e.g., the “Report phishing” drop-down menu option in Gmail, the “Report Message” 
add-in button for Microsoft Outlook or the “Report Spam” add-on for Thunderbird), the 
effort required to implement a reporting mechanism and integrate it into the daily rou-
tine of a company or its employees is probably acceptable. If a user neither falls for the 
phishing email nor reports it within the first 24 h, it is likely that it was missed, ignored, 
or not processed by the user, due to reasons such as being out of the office or having a 
day off. The period of 24 hours has been reported by [75] and confirmed by the obser-
vation made by Mohebzada et al. that many users fell for their phishing attempt even 
though their campaign was only active for 18 h. The results of [48, 75] are summarized 
in Fig. 8.
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However, one challenge related to such reporting systems is analyzing the reported 
emails and providing feedback. If a company does not have the staff and processes in 
place to react to such reports and provide feedback, employees might lose interest in 
reporting phishing emails [138]. This lack of interest would, in turn, make measuring the 
impact of training efforts difficult. While there is some practical advice available from 
renowned sources (e.g., from the SANS Institute [145]) on how to design a good report-
ing process, it remains unclear which advice is backed by science and which is not. A 
literature review with a focus on the design of such a reporting system would be needed 
to shed more light on this question.
Privacy: Another requirement is the support of adequate privacy features. Although 
they are not related to the core performance of an anti-phishing training effort, such fea-
tures are crucial for any practical tool to protect its user’s privacy. To this end, statistics 
and tracking mechanisms should work with pseudonyms. Structural measures such as 
the isolation of analytics from the sending component in these tools are also necessary. 
Different aggregation and anonymization schemes for creating reports, such as k-ano-
nymity and differential privacy, should be integrated into the tool [146].
Automated optimization of training parameters: Using data from multiple institutions, 
companies and sectors may also provide opportunities for synergistic gains, as analyzing 
the impact of different factors on training effectiveness could be made more streamlined 
and generic. Data sharing among stakeholders enables large-scale and long-term analy-
sis with which the impact of different factors on training effectiveness can be measured. 
The results could then be used to automatically and continuously fine-tune the training 
parameters of the participating stakeholders.
Anti-phishing training tools and available features
There are intrinsic links among the factors that determine the success of a phishing 
attack, the effectiveness of anti-phishing training and the construction and operation 
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of an anti-phishing training tool. To get an idea whether or not today’s anti-phishing 
training tools come with the functionality required to implement a training as out-
lined in the previous two subsections, we searched the Internet for such tools. More 
specifically, for each desired functionality or feature (e.g., a level-based approach to 
training where the training level is automatically determined and adjusted based on 
the user’s feedback), we attempted to identify at least one commercial or non-com-
mercial tool that offered it. In summary, we found that the currently available tools 
lack at least one of the desired features. However, since our findings are based on 
information that could be found using search engines and/or by browsing the respec-
tive webpages of each product only, we might have overlooked tools for which this 
information is not available through these channels. A more detailed summary of our 
most important finding regarding the aspects discussed in the vious subsection can 
be found below.
Progression system: We could not identify any tool that supports an individualized 
automated user progress tracking and level system. Automated tracking and modi-
fication of training intensity based on user feedback, personality traits, psychologi-
cal processes, and progress have not been implemented in any anti-phishing training 
tool. Furthermore, scientific algorithms that could help to select targets and/or deter-
mine why an employee fails to identify phishing threats (e.g., the CRI) have not been 
implemented.
Emails: While most of the available tools support template mechanisms, they all 
lack the ability to categorize templates based on detection difficulty. Additionally, 
none offers a mechanism that can automatically alter a template to increase or reduce 
its detection difficulty. The shortcomings of existing tools include the lack of func-
tionality by which to manage the URLs automatically used in training emails and 
mutations thereof in a company’s DNS infrastructure. Some tools ship with templates 
mimicking emails of well-known Internet companies, such as Google or Amazon. 
Others offer a version of a template exchange platform based on Github, but we did 
not identify a tool with a directly-integrated platform usable for everyone.
Automatic population of user database: Most available tools support manual user 
imports, for instance via comma-separated values (csv) files or through a Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) connection. These features must be extended to 
automatically pull new users from an organization’s central user database and start 
their training.
Feedback pages: Most tools offer the ability to upload HTML content that will be pre-
sented to the user when he or she clicks on the link in the phishing email. This mecha-
nism could be used to upload educational material. However, as most tools are using 
campaigns to send out phishing emails, such a page can only be defined on the campaign 
level. An ideal solution would require individual landing pages matching the sent phish-
ing email and therefore matching the level a user is currently on; in addition, these land-
ing pages should be displayed in a form that is adjusted to a user’s psychological and 
personality traits. We could not find any available tool that offered such a feature.
Retraining system: As most tools use a campaign system, retraining cannot be applied 
as proposed in our analysis. After each campaign, an administrator would have to ana-
lyze the results of each user and manually schedule the follow-up training sessions.
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Phishing email reporting system: Some of the tools we looked at offer a way for users 
to report an email as an instance of phishing. However, this mechanism is usually con-
nected to the anti-phishing training system only and does not relay information about 
real threats to the company’s email filtering solution.
Automated optimization of training parameters: Most tools assess and create reports 
on the performance of users and create a report about it. However, we could not iden-
tify any tool that continuously analyzes the impact of training parameters, such as train-
ing frequency or email types, on training effectiveness. Therefore, we could not find any 
available tool which makes recommendations on how to modify the training parameters 
for enhancing the training gains.
Conclusion
Phishing is a growing security issue for both institutions and individuals. Although 
there are various mitigation techniques, proactive anti-phishing training is an important 
building block of any multi-level phishing defense strategy. In this paper, we identified 
various factors that influence the effectiveness of such training efforts. Building on our 
analysis of the research literature, we outlined how an effective anti-phishing training 
program should be designed and implemented. Based on the weak coherence between 
our empirical findings and currently used anti-phishing training solutions, we believe 
that this contribution addresses a crucial technical gap.
In our discussion, we outlined several implications of our findings concerning the 
design and capabilities of anti-phishing tools. Significant design aspects and capabili-
ties in this regard are automated operation and individualization with continuous assess-
ment/optimization of the configuration of training parameters. This is crucial, as our 
literature analysis showed that research results concerning some of the parameters are 
inconclusive or even contradictory, indicating that these parameters require further 
investigation. Moreover, an effective anti-phishing training tool should have community 
functions to facilitate cooperation and load-balancing among disparate anti-phishing 
efforts (e.g., shared email templates or co-designed training curricula.)
Based on our survey and analysis of relevant sources in the technical literature, we 
found that, despite the various advanced capabilities that tools currently available in the 
anti-phishing domain offer, such tools only support a limited subset of the potential fac-
tors identified as necessary to yield the desired training effects. Therefore, we believe 
that our work does have a high practical value in terms of contributing to the devel-
opment of more complete training solutions with a more significant impact to reduce 
phishing susceptibility on the part of users. We are convinced that greater awareness of 
phishing techniques and means of addressing them increases overall security and peace 
of mind.
Future research directions
Our survey points out that two key research directions: First, the factors on anti-phish-
ing training effectiveness deserve further research with more extensive and diverse 
experiments in higher numbers focusing on the gray areas, i.e., where contradictory 
results are available in the current body of work. Second, phishing awareness training, 
as done today, has several limitations. First of all, this includes a lack of consideration of 
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scientific results that are available in the scientific outputs. Furthermore, a lack of indi-
vidualization of training limits the efficiency of training. Thus, how to customize train-
ing based on trainee profiles is another research topic.
Once the training is done, another requirement becomes evident, leading to another 
research direction: how to measure the training effect. This is accompanied by the lack 
of ensuring long-term training benefits. More studies are necessary to show the long-
term effects of anti-phishing training and make the results of these studies comparable. 
To this end, we will conduct further iterations of our survey in the future to see how the 
research in this field has progressed over the years and to compare new findings.
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